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BACKGROUND ON THE AMERICAN SYSTEM
The federal-state unemployment insurance (UI) program was established by the Social Security Act of 1935 to provide temporary partial wage replacement to involuntarily unemployed persons actively seeking new jobs. While a few states had nascent programs or draft legislation before 1935, most states and localities were reluctant to independently establish UI programs for fear of competitively disadvantaging resident industries with added costs.
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A federal incentive to create state UI programs was provided by the innovation of a tax incentive. A federal unemployment tax was imposed on wages paid by UI-covered employers with a 90 percent reduction in the federal tax granted to employers in states establishing UI systems in conformity with federal guidelines. 2 The tax revenue accruing from the 10 percent retained by the federal government is used for grants to states for program administration, partially supporting federal UI administrative expenses, funding public employment services (ES), paying the federal share of benefits under the permanent extended benefits program, providing support for federal expenses incurred in operating the UI and employment service functions, and making loans to pay regular benefits when state reserves are inadequate. Federal law provides states with the latitude to establish practices that adapt to the economic and cultural conditions in that state. The interplay of federal and state partners has resulted in a system that varies greatly at the state level but maintains important federal standards nationwide.
1 In 1932, Wisconsin enacted the first state UI law, and Massachusetts and Ohio both had draft legislation before 1935 (West and Hildebrand 1997) .
2 Title III of the Social Security Act established federal grants to the states to perform administrative functions for UI, and Title IX established the federal unemployment tax and related provisions (Blaustein 1993, pp. 151-153) . The federal tax rebate incentive for states to establish UI programs was found to be constitutional by the Supreme Court in 1937 (Blaustein 1993, pp. 157-158). There are five main goals for the federal-state UI system: 1) to provide temporary partial wage replacement during involuntary unemployment, 2) to prevent dispersal of employers' workforces during temporary layoffs, 3) to promote rapid return to work, 4) to limit business downturns by maintaining aggregate purchasing power, and 5) to encourage stabilization of employment in enterprises through experience rating (O'Leary and Straits 2004) . The experience rating feature of UI tax contribution rates means that tax rates are higher for employers with more benefit charges, and vice versa. Experience rating is a financing feature of UI that is unique to the United States. In addition to acting as an incentive to stabilize employment, it is intended to reduce moral hazard for layoffs by increasing employer involvement in monitoring UI eligibility, as well as by making employers aware that layoffs have consequences for their tax rate.
3 Over the 80-year history of the program, the main objectives were largely met during the first 40 years, but many program elements have eroded since the 1980s.
The original benefit provisions in most state UI laws were modest, whereas financing features tended to be aggressive. In 1936, the federal taxable wage base of $3,000 was high enough to mean that 95 percent of all wages paid in the country were subject to the 3 percent federal tax rate. The combination led to the accumulation of reserves in the states. Ten years after program establishment, system reserves were over 10 percent of total wages in UI-covered employment (USDOL 2015) . The accumulated reserves led to improved benefit levels and longer potential durations. By the 1970s, benefits typically replaced 50 percent of lost wages up to the state maximum weekly benefit amount for up to 26 weeks of involuntary unemployment. 3 Fath and Fuest (2005) summarize research evidence that experience rating stabilizes employment when it is effective in the United States. However, state taxable wage base limits, tax rate maximums, and solvency taxes limit the range of experience rating and the effectiveness of employment stabilization. 4 A similar pattern of modest beginnings with improved financing and benefit adequacy over time can be observed in newer UI programs among many countries in Latin America (Summit of the Americas Center 2003). 4 consequently, changes to the UI system have often been done as part of the budget reconciliation process, because the federal Unemployment Trust Fund (UTF) is treated as part of the unified federal budget, even though the states raise all the money for supporting their own state UI systems. Accumulated UTF reserves reduce the reported annual federal deficit in any budget year, even though they belong to the states and can only be used to pay a state's UI claims.
A chronology of conformity requirements is given in Table 1 . The original requirements covered prompt payment of benefits, location of payments, appeals procedures, management of funds, reporting to the U.S. Department of Labor, and the requirement of experience rating as the basis for receiving the 90 percent reduction in FUTA tax rates. Requirements added in the 1940s and 1950s were included mainly to simplify procedures when interstate claims were involved. In more recent years, states have complained that federal conformity requirements have become more specific and their value more questionable. These requirements govern things like the earnings amount or duration of reemployment required to qualify after a benefit denial, the nonpayment of benefits to professional athletes in the off-season, and rules for reducing benefits based on pension income.
After 1969, when the UI trust fund was first included in the federal unified budget, some new program features were added with the aim of conserving UI funds and improving the overall budget picture. One of these was the 1993 law that established the Worker Profiling and Reemployment Services (WPRS) system to provide early reemployment services targeted to UI beneficiaries at highest risk of long-duration UI benefit receipt.  Make full payment of benefits when due  Make benefit payments through public employment offices  Have a fair appeals hearing process  Transfer tax receipts immediately to the Unemployment Trust Fund (UTF)  Use withdrawals from the state account in the UTF only to pay UI benefits  Make required reports to the U.S. Secretary of Labor  Provide information to any federal agency running public works or assistance  Not deny benefits to eligible individuals  Not pay benefits until two years after contributions start  Not deny benefits for refusal to fill a vacancy resulting from a labor strike  States may repeal their UI laws at their own discretion  Additional employer rate reductions must be based on experience rating Additional federal requirements were added in the following years regarding:
 Interstate claims rights  Rules for combining earnings from multiple employers to gain entitlement  Broadened coverage of employers  Allowing claimants receiving approved training to be eligible for UI  Requirement that states must participate in the Extended Benefits (EB) program  Denial of benefits to workers who are not legal residents with employment privileges More federal requirements in later years regard:
 Intervening work required for requalification  Denial to professional athletes during the off-season  Benefit reduction for public pension income Restrictions motivated by the desire to conserve funds in the federal budget:
 The Unified Budget Act of 1969 added the Unemployment Trust Fund to the annual federal budget.  Federal eligibility requirements for extended benefits were adopted.  The Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 was passed.  New claimants were profiled to identify those most likely to exhaust benefits, and they were required to participate in ES.  States were required to make withholding of federal income tax possible for beneficiaries.
Federal rules have become increasingly specific. For example, new federal laws in the 1980s and 1990s allowed the use of UI trust-fund money to promote self-employment and shorttime compensation.
8 Recent years have seen increased monitoring of compliance with federal guidelines for accuracy and timeliness of benefit payments, appeals, and tax contributions. While 8 States can use their UI programs to encourage self-employment by providing work-search waivers and continued weekly benefit payments for some beneficiaries at risk of long-duration UI receipt. The UI system is also available to support employer short-time or work-sharing plans, whereby instead of a proportion of workers being laid off, there is a proportionate reduction in hours for all employees in the affected work unit. The employees with reduced hours then receive a share of their full UI weekly benefit amount equal to the proportionate reduction in hours.
6 both Presidents Truman and Eisenhower proposed standards for state benefits, there have never been conformity requirements on basic matters like the level of the weekly benefit amount and the duration of benefits (Becker 1961 
Eligibility
Unemployment insurance in the United States is regarded as social insurance, having elements of both private insurance and social welfare. Eligibility rules are set to reduce individual moral hazard by requiring three things: 1) that applicants be involuntarily jobless because of an unavoidable job separation; 2) have sufficiently strong recent attachment to the labor force; and 3) be able, available, and actively seeking work. The greatest variation among states is the difference in the level of recent income required to qualify for UI benefit eligibility.
Some states require as little as $1,000 over the prior base year, while others require as much as $5,000. To accommodate administrative systems, the base year is normally defined as the first four of the past five completed calendar quarters. The Pennington decision and federal encouragement has induced states to consider earnings over the most recent four quarters when income was not sufficient over the standard period.
States maintain records of all wages paid by UI-covered employers. These wage data can be readily accessed to assess eligibility and entitlements for UI applicants. The majority of state rules for benefit eligibility, levels, and durations are computed on base-period earnings drawn 8 from wage records. Naturally, UI applicants can add wages based on documentation if administrative wage records are incomplete. Wage records are also used by states to set program parameters, including the maximum weekly benefit amount.
Generosity
The standard of benefit adequacy accepted in the research literature is 50 percent wage replacement for up to six months, with a maximum benefit amount equal to two-thirds the average wage in covered employment (ACUC 1996) . These levels were common among states by the 1960s and for more than 50 years thereafter, but in response to the UI debt accumulated by states during the Great The National Bureau of Economic Research business-cycle dating committee set the official length of the contraction starting in December 2007 at 18 months. It was the longest U.S. contraction since the Great Depression, which started in August 1929. The Great Recession earned its name not only from its length but from the speed of decline following the evaporation of credit, the permanence of high-wage job loss, and the international ripples it caused, which are still being felt (Grusky, Western, and Wimer 2011) .
11 Originally, a handful of state unemployment tax laws also required employee contributions. Today, only Alaska and New Jersey have employee contributions, with a Pennsylvania employee tax triggering in crisis periods. It should be noted that employee taxes probably increase UI take-up among eligible unemployed, thereby resulting in higher system costs for a given level of unemployment. There is research evidence that even in the current situation, where employers directly pay the tax, employees indirectly share in the cost of financing UI benefits by accepting wages that are lower than would prevail in the absence of UI (Anderson and Meyer 2000 Since 1939, the FUTA tax base has been increased only three times; most recently it reached $7,000 in 1983. The FUTA taxable wage base now stands at less than 6 percent of the Social Security taxable wage base. In 1937, more than 95 percent of all wages and salaries in UIcovered employment were subject to the FUTA tax, but by 2015, only about 25 percent were subject to the FUTA tax (O'Leary and Kline 2016). All states must have state tax rates that are at least 90 percent of the FUTA levels before reduction, and they must have taxable wage bases that are at least at the FUTA level. Under the so-called state unemployment tax acts (SUTA), two state taxable wage bases are at the federal minimum of $7,000 and more than half are less than double the FUTA base. The stagnant tax base has contributed to insufficient buildup of reserves to forward-fund benefits, which has resulted in adverse distributional consequences and tax incidence. The insufficient forward-funding may have contributed to eight states reducing potential benefit durations over the past five years (O'Leary 2013). The limited tax base may also dampen hiring of low-wage workers, for whom employers pay a relatively larger share of total annual compensation in UI taxes. Naturally, states could alternatively improve benefit financing by raising tax rates instead of the tax base, but raising tax rates appears to be an even more challenging political maneuver.
The ACUC (1996) recommended incentive approaches for inducing states to forwardfund benefits. For example, one approach would be to adjust interest payments on positivebalance reserves so that they were at a higher rate for balances above an adequate level of reserves and at a lower rate for reserves below that threshold. The average high-cost rate (AHCR) for a state UI system is the average over the past 20 years of the three highest values of the ratio of benefit payments to total taxable payrolls. The U.S. Department of Labor target for forward-funding is that AHCR be at a value of one or higher. 12 The USDOL judgment in setting this target is that one year of average recession-level benefits in reserve, together with regular system revenues, should be sufficient to avoid borrowing in most recessions. Vroman (2016) asserts that UI financing systems operate best when kept in balance with benefit systems. That is, if the maximum benefit amount increases with average wage levels, then the taxable wage base should also increase along with average wage levels. If not, over time a structural imbalance will emerge from wage growth in which benefit payments exceed tax revenues.
Reemployment
The UI work test is part of the social insurance aspect of UI to reduce the moral hazard of avoidable joblessness. As noted above, the work test requires beneficiaries to be able, available, and actively seeking work. Failure to fully comply with the work test has been identified as one of the main sources of UI payment errors (Burgess and Kingston 1987; Clarkwest et al. 2012) . In an effort to restore a reemployment emphasis to UI, the Labor Department funded the Reemployment and Eligibility Assessment (REA) program, in which states participate on a voluntary basis. Some research evidence suggests that shorter UI durations from WPRS result from the unwelcome prospect of having to participate in services rather than the actual content of those services (Black et al. 2003 ), but a more recent evaluation involving randomized controlled trials suggests a positive value for reemployment services (Michaelides et al. 2012 As states increasingly required UI claims to be filed by telephone or through the Internet, contact between UI applicants and employment services decreased. In 2010, USDOL established a work group composed of leaders at the federal, state, and local levels to develop approaches to better connect UI with other employment and training programs. The work group developed a national vision for better connecting these programs, and three key "transformational elements"
were tested on a pilot basis in New York and Mississippi and were subsequently evaluated by Martinson et al. (2015) . The three concepts piloted were 1) integrated workforce registration, which enabled claimants to simultaneously register for a range of programs, including UI, ES, and WIA; 2) real-time triage, which involves continuously making use of accumulated data on claimants to provide claimants with an updated mix of possible services they could access; and 3) skills transferability, which includes new ways of matching claimants with new occupations based on the claimants' skills, backgrounds, and interests.
AREAS OF EXPLICIT FEDERAL-STATE COOPERATION Permanent Federal-State Extended Benefits Program
The Extended Unemployment Compensation Act of 1970 created a permanent program for UI extended benefits (EB) to be paid when the insured unemployment rate (IUR) exceeded set trigger levels. 14 The EB program involves a 50-50 sharing of benefit payment costs between federal and state governments. When triggered, the EB program lengthens potential durations by 50 percent of the entitled duration of regular UI benefits. In most states, that means an additional 13 weeks of benefits after the entitlement to regular UI is exhausted. 15 Benefits under EB are paid at the same weekly rate as regular UI. The EB program paid benefits in recessions in several states during the first 10 years after enactment, but it has rarely been triggered since that time.
Originally, the EB program was a good example of federal-state cooperation. However, in recent years the triggers based on insured unemployment have rarely activated EB when total unemployment rises (Nicholson and Needels 2006) . Under the original 1970 law, EB could be activated by a national trigger affecting all states, or a state-level trigger affecting EB only in that 14 The IUR is the rate of insured unemployed persons in a period as a percentage of the UI-covered employed persons in the period. This ratio depends on the rate of UI application, the rules for benefit eligibility, and the enforcement of eligibility rules. 15 States can opt to add an additional 25 percent of the regular potential duration to the EB duration.
14 particular state. 16 In the early 1980s, the national trigger was eliminated and the state trigger threshold was raised from 4.0 to 5.0 percent (Woodbury and Rubin 1997) . 17 Additionally, increasing eligibility requirements in some states resulted in low UI recipiency rates and low IUR rates that failed to trigger EB even when the total unemployment rate (TUR) had risen quite high (Blank and Card 1991) . In response to the failure of EB to be activated in more than a few states during the early 1990s recession, Congress in July 1992 passed legislation allowing states to adopt an alternative trigger based on the total unemployment rate (TUR) as estimated by the Current Population Survey.
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In the 1990s and 2000s, emergency federal UI extensions were structured to be paid before any EB that might be available. Consequently, the EB program has not actively functioned in the past 40 years. The ARRA provided temporary 100 percent federal reimbursement of EB payments for states that adopted alternative EB triggers based on the TUR.
The 100 percent payment for EB was continued through midyear 2014 for states with conforming TUR triggers. All states that adopted TUR triggers had EB become effective during the Great Recession, but a survey of states revealed that almost all TUR adopters said they would return to IUR triggers after the 100 percent federal funding ended (Mastri et al. 2016 ). "when due"-that is, in a timely fashion relative to the date of application rather than after the end of what could be a protracted eligibility appeals process. "Reviewing the history of the Social Security Act led the court to the conclusion that "when due" was intended to mean at the earliest stage of unemployment that such payments were administratively feasible after giving both the worker and the employer an opportunity to be heard (USDOL 1971) . Monitoring recoverable overpayment rates is a way to encourage state accuracy on the benefit payment side, and monitoring the rate of tax determination encourages accuracy on the system revenue side.
Data-Sharing for Interstate Claims and Benefit Payments
These four summary performance indicators are representative of a finer set of performance measures based on four quarters of administrative data.
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Reed Act Distributions
Originally, employer FUTA tax payments were recorded as general revenues of the U.S.
government, and UI administrative expenses were paid for out of general revenues. By the early 21 A summary of these main UI performance targets and results can be found at http://www.oui.doleta.gov/unemploy/docs/GPRA_Summary_Report.asp. 22 For example, benefits accuracy is measured by four indicators, program integrity is measured by four indicators, appeals timeliness is measured by three indicators, and there are three tax indicators. Details can be found at http://www.oui.doleta.gov/unemploy/pdf/Core_Measures.pdf.
1950s, it was estimated that FUTA revenues exceeded UI administrative grants to states by between $500 million and $1 billion annually (West and Hildebrand 1997) . The Employment Security Administrative Financing Act of 1954 requires that any excess amount of FUTA revenues over UI administrative grants to states be deposited to the UTF in a new account to make loans to states when their reserves were insufficient to pay UI benefits. The financing act, commonly called the Reed Act, set a limit on the level of reserves in the loan account and provided that reserves above that ceiling level be distributed to states for payment of regular benefits, program administration, or delivery of ES.
23 Over time, the Reed Act ceilings became less binding as Congress, motivated by the desire to control annual deficits in the unified federal budget, relaxed the Reed Act ceiling trigger from 0.33 percent of total payrolls in UI covered employment in 1982 to 1.02 percent of covered payrolls today (Vroman 2008) . Consequently, the incentive supplied by the Reed Act for Congress to adequately appropriate money from the UTF for UI administration has diminished. Nonetheless, the Reed Act mechanism is an important example of a mechanism for maintaining balance in a decentralized federal-state system.
AREAS OF STATE INNOVATION Bond Financing of Benefit Payment Debt
An alternative to forward-funding is pay-as-you-go financing of benefits. The fundamental principle of finance is that "money today is worth more than money tomorrow." By keeping employer UI taxes low, states will likely see declining reserve balances when unemployment rises, but they keep money in the hands of private-sector businesses, where jobs are created. In today's low-interest-rate environment, UI benefit payment debt can be financed by tax-exempt state revenue bonds at interest rates far below the lending rates available from the federal government. Under Title XII of the Social Security Act, states with insufficient reserves can borrow from the U.S. Treasury. Currently the Title XII lending rate is 2.23 percent, while rates on state revenue bonds are below 0.5 percent. 24 Some states have adopted the pay-as-yougo model, which is a rational cost-saving approach in a low-interest-rate environment.
However, this will not always be the case. When rates eventually rise, and the spreads between
Title XII loans and tax-exempt state revenue bonds shrink or flip, forward-funding will regain appeal. Unfortunately, switching financing schemes in times of crisis can be very costly to states.
Not only is forward-funding a countercyclical stabilizer, it is a less risky policy option for states, since advance building of reserves is less risky than dealing with unexpected debt. Most states that bond-financed debts accumulated during the Great Recession did not raise their tax rates or taxable wage bases, but many bond-financing states shortened potential durations of UI benefits.
Furthermore, states that financed benefits by bond sales usually had lower-than-average benefitwage replacement ratios.
AREAS OF FEDERAL LEADERSHIP Holding State Reserves for Payment of Benefits
The Social Security Act requires that all employer UI tax payments be deposited into the 
Financing State Program Administration
The federal-state relationship has been greatly affected in recent years by the federal budget implications of state actions. Tension has been obvious in recent years over the issue of administrative financing. Federal grants to states for UI administration are determined by a formula based on workload factors such as the number of UI claims, appeals, and covered employers. The formula also depends on the estimated time cost of serving claimants and salaries of state UI staff. The time-cost estimates used are based on studies done in the 1970s, with the latest updates having occurred no more recently than 1984. Since that time, there have been many changes in practices and office technology within the states. The federal-state struggle over administrative funding has been a constant source of tension in recent years.
Naturally there are economies of scale in automated administrative systems, but some states have objected to the workload-driven formula because states sometimes contribute more to the ESAA than they receive back in administrative grants. Driven by tight budgets, the federal government has tried to conserve funds, while the states have claimed that federal holdings for administration are state entitlements that should be distributed. Davidson and Martin (1996) have viewed the UI administrative financing standoff as a classic principal-agent problem. The federal partner is the principal seeking to administer a high-quality UI program through its agents, the state employment security agencies. Davidson and Martin argue that to encourage high-quality service, efficient low-cost administration, and continuous quality improvement, the administrative funding mechanism should fulfill two criteria: 1) it should be based on the quality of service as measured through a simple monitoring system operated by the federal partner to assess state practice, and 2) it should permit states to retain unspent financial grants. Special administrative grants could also be made to states with high unemployment or low population density where administrative costs are higher because of these factors but not because of inefficiency. Such a system would also have the effect of encouraging UI taxpayers to monitor administrative efficiency at the local and state levels, so as to increase the share of administrative grants retained for other uses, including benefit payments.
Incentive for States to Forward-Fund Benefits
For a state UI system to be sustainable in the long run, revenues should match expenditures, on average, over business cycles. The accepted standard for UI benefit financing is based on the principle of forward-funding. Having money in reserves when unemployment increases means states do not have to raise employer UI taxes during recessions. Therefore, forward-funding reduces or eliminates any UI tax increases that could drive the economy into a worse situation when business conditions are weak. Accumulating reserves during economic recoveries puts a slight damper on expansions but helps avoid severe financing crises in the depths of recessions.
To achieve adequate forward-funding, state accounts in the federal Unemployment Trust Fund (UTF) should maintain balances "sufficient to pay at least one year of unemployment insurance benefits at levels comparable to its previous high cost" (ACUC 1996, p. 11) . In 2010, this rule was put into place as a federal requirement for interest-free loans. The rule requires 22 states to hold one year of reserves in the UTF equal to the average of the three highest-cost rates experienced in the prior 20 years. This rate is known as the average high-cost rate (AHCR). The rule becomes fully effective in 2019; in 2014, it started to be phased in at a target rate of 50 percent of the AHCR and increases of 10 percentage points each year until it reaches the AHCR in 2019.
Loans to States to Pay Benefits
Most states that exhaust their reserve balance use the normal UI benefit financing procedure for loans available from the U.S. Treasury under Title XII of the Social Security Act.
Funds available for loans to states are accumulated from the annual FUTA tax levy that all UIcovered employers pay. As mentioned in the previous subsection, adequate forward-funding means zero-interest short-term loans will be available, but states must pay interest charges on Economic theory suggests that longer potential UI durations can induce longer periods of benefit receipt (Decker 1997) . Some scholars suggest this happened in the 2008-2012 period, when generous EUC was available with longer durations; however, others find no evidence that EUC affected the rate of leaving insured unemployment (Farber, Rothstein, and Valletta 2015) .
In addition to partially replacing lost income, UI also aims to help stabilize the macroeconomy and arrest the descent into poverty by the unemployed. Yang, Lasky, and Page (2010) of the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) assessed the timeliness and cost-effectiveness of 11 macroeconomic stimulus measures. They rated EUC the most effective because of a large income multiplier, and because EUC is a one-time expenditure that does not add to the nation's structural deficit. A related CBO analysis by Acs and Dahl (2010) found that among households in 2009 with at least one member of the household unemployed, those receiving EUC08 had a poverty rate of 19.6 percent, while the poverty rate of those same households would have been 24.3 percent without EUC.
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In addition to EUC08 extending UI benefits during the Great Recession, the American 
Program Innovations
In recent years, new UI program elements have been added by the federal government as state options. These have been intended to provide flexibility in meeting worker and employer needs. Three features of particular importance involve 1) targeting reemployment services to those most likely to exhaust UI benefits, 2) waiving UI work-search for those starting selfemployment, and 3) using short-time compensation (STC or worksharing) arrangements to avoid layoffs.
Concern for helping dislocated workers displaced by industrial restructuring in the 1980s
led to a series of field experiments in UI (Wandner 2010 
Mentoring State Program Administrators
The U.S. Department of Labor, together with the National Association of State Workforce Agencies (NASWA), mentors new state UI program administrators and state program management staff. In most cases, the chief state UI administrator is a political appointee who serves for a limited time period. However, the legal responsibilities of the position are real, and the decisions that must be made often carry great weight. In 2015, the U.S. Department of Labor published a manual for state administrators titled "Unemployment Insurance Directors Guide."
The manual provides a comprehensive summary of the program and the director's responsibilities. In addition to general annual conferences on workforce development, NASWA hosts annual UI director's conferences. These institutions accelerate the learning process for UI program administrators. Additionally, the U.S. Department of Labor has well-established mechanisms for documenting regulations that are contained in the Federal Register, reviewing state proposed legislative changes for federal conformity, and publishing occasional program letters announcing available grants and program changes. Annual events are scheduled for training state staff in areas of program emphasis, including financial forecasting of reserve balances and updating WPRS profiling models. The resources available to state directors and their administrative staffs are well developed and continuously improving.
UI Modernization under ARRA
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The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) of 2009 provided financial incentives for expansions of UI eligibility that together were referred to as UI modernization.
The incentives were offered to expand aspects of UI eligibility. The financial incentives totaled $7 billion and were allocated to states based on their share of national unemployment. States could receive one-third of their potential incentive payment for having an alternate base period (ABP) available for monetary determination of UI eligibility that includes the most recently completed calendar quarter. States could receive the remaining two-thirds of their allocation for having any two of the following four additional program features: 1) UI eligibility while seeking only part-time work, 2) UI eligibility after job separations due to harassment or compelling family reasons, 3) continuation of UI benefits for at least 26 additional weeks after exhaustion of regular benefits while in approved training, and 4) dependents' allowances of at least $15 per dependent up to $50. By the conclusion of the program-funding year that ended on June 30, 2011, when the incentive offers expired, 41 states had received modernization payments for having an ABP, and 36 of these states also received the remaining two-thirds of their available funds. The number of states adopting each of the additional features was as follows: 28 extended eligibility to claimants seeking part-time work, 21 allowed eligibility for those who were unemployed for family reasons, 16 provided benefits to exhaustees while in training, and 7 included dependents' allowances. Some states already had some of the incentivized features, but the features added by states tended to be the options that had a lower expected cost. A total of $4.4 billion, or 63 percent, of the potential total amount of the modernization budget was disbursed under the 28 program, but nearly $2.6 billion went unclaimed by states. The modernization grants offered temporary financial relief to states during the crisis of the Great Recession but also established future liabilities for states that expanded eligibility to qualify for payments. ARRA prohibited UI modernization payments for state law changes that included a sunset provision, but ARRA did not prohibit states from repealing legislation after they qualified for a UI modernization incentive payment. Five states have already repealed some or all of the expansions of UI eligibility adopted to qualify for modernization payments.
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Special Unemployment Benefits Programs
The federal government funds and administers four special unemployment benefit programs: 1) Disaster Unemployment Assistance (DUA), 2) Unemployment Compensation for Federal Employees (UCFE), 3) Unemployment Compensation for Ex-Military (UCX) Personnel, and Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA). Applicants for these must qualify for UI benefits under regular state programs, and benefits are funded by the federal government. There are usually special eligibility rules in disaster situations, and TAA benefits are payable only after regular UI benefits are exhausted.
When a natural disaster happens, many people involuntarily lose their jobs, at least temporarily. Applicants who qualify for regular UI may receive compensation based on earned entitlement and the disaster-caused job loss. However, if the president of the United States declares a disaster area, DUA is available to any unemployed worker or self-employed individual who lived, worked, or was scheduled to work in the disaster area at the time of the disaster, and who, because of the disaster, is struggling with one of four situations: the person 1) no longer has a job or a place to work, 2) cannot reach the place of work, 3) cannot work because of damage to the place of work, or 4) cannot work because of an injury caused by the disaster.
31 DUA is not available to persons who are otherwise eligible for regular UI benefits, but DUA is available to individuals who become heads of households and are seeking work because the former head of household died as a result of the disaster. This is true even if the new head of household has no prior work history. DUA benefits are payable to those individuals whose unemployment continues to be a result of the major disaster, but only for the number of weeks of unemployment that occurred during the Disaster Assistance Period (DAP). The DAP begins with the first weekday following the date the major disaster began and continues for up to 26 weeks after the date on which a disaster was declared by the president. The maximum weekly benefit amount payable is determined under the provisions of the state law for unemployment compensation in the state where the disaster occurred. However, the minimum weekly benefit amount payable is half (50 percent) of the average benefit amount in the state. DUA has been available to persons affected by natural disasters such as hurricanes, tornados, and earthquakes. It was also offered to 
LESSONS FOR A EUROPEAN UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS SYSTEM
The United States has more than 80 years of experience operating a multitiered unemployment insurance system. As the European Union (EU) considers developing its own
Assistance program (NAFTA-TAA) was created by the North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act (P.L. 103-182). 33 RTAA is a special wage-supplement program for trade-affected workers aged 50 or older who return to work at jobs paying less than their trade-affected employment. RTAA pays 50 percent of the difference between separation and reemployment wages up to a total of $12,000 over two years. Reemployment must be full-time (at least 35 hours per week) in one or more jobs, or part time (at least 20 hours per week) while also participating in TAA-approved training. Reemployment must not be expected to pay more than $55,000 per year or include a return to the employment from which the worker separated. multitiered unemployment insurance system, the U.S. experience offers some useful insights for the EU to consider.
Gradual Development
The current multitiered system in the United States differs significantly today from the structure in the 1930s. This is not surprising, of course, given the changes in technology, the economy, and the labor force. Indeed, if anything, we are surprised at how little the system has changed. Two areas where the system has evolved are discussed below-the federal rules for conformity and federal support for states to engage in activities to monitor claimant work-search activity. In addition, states themselves have modified their systems by adjusting benefit amounts and potential durations.
As described above, states are required to meet certain requirements for their UI system to be considered in conformity with federal law. Employers in states that fail to be in conformity do not receive the 90 percent FUTA tax reduction for employers, and the state does not receive federal payments for administrating the state UI system; thus, the conformity provisions include substantial financial pressures for states to meet them. As noted above, the original UI legislation included 12 provisions, and additional requirements have been added over time. The most recent additions have included federal eligibility requirements for extended benefits, requirements for states to establish profiling systems to identify claimants likely to exhaust their benefits, and requirements for states to establish systems allowing beneficiaries to choose federal income-tax withholdings. Interestingly, some of the U.S. conformity changes have been rather minor, such as denying benefits to professional athletes, while others, such as requiring participation in the extended benefits program, have represented major changes to the system. As noted above, in the United States, conformity requirements do not specify rules for setting wage replacement rates or maximum weekly benefit amounts, which as of January 2016 for states are encouraged to use their WPRS statistical models to target RESEA services on those predicted to be most likely to exhaust benefits. During the Great Recession, all states received large grants to provide reemployment services (RES) to claimants, but these grants were onetime efforts and were not continued.
Approaches to Encouraging Lower-Tier Behavior
Much of the concern in a multitiered system involves principal-agent problems-efforts by the higher-level entity (the federal government) to get the lower tier (the states) to behave in accordance with the higher tier's wishes. The UI system in the United States has made use of a variety of approaches to influence state behavior: mandates, discretionary grants, and universal The lesson here is that all three approaches can be effective, but they have different pros and cons. Mandating certain behavior is least expensive to the higher tier but may not be politically feasible, particularly if the lower-tier members have sovereignty and different preferences for policies. The universal funding approach is generally effective in getting the lower-tier members to implement the policy, but the cost to the higher tier is much higher.
Finally, the voluntary approach is intermediate in terms of cost to the higher tier, but participation by the lower tier may be limited. This slower response can be advantageous, as in the case of REA/RESEA, where gradual implementation permitted states to try different approaches, and evaluations were conducted to provide more information on the effectiveness of REA/RESEA. The UI Modernization Act, passed during the Great Recession, offers another example of the use of financial incentives to encourage states to behave in a particular way; in the modernization program, states could obtain substantial federal funding by adopting specific policies designed to increase the population eligible for UI or provide additional benefits.
Financing Provisions
Financing of the U.S. system is complex, and the structure has both advantages and disadvantages that should be considered by the EU. As was described in more detail above, funds for the UI program in the United States are primarily raised through payroll taxes on employers; the funds are sent to the federal government and most of the money returned to the states that meet conformity requirements. Funds for state administrative functions are financed from the 10 percent federal reserve of FUTA tax revenues. The U.S. approach to UI financing may not be the right strategy for the EU, but it offers some interesting options, which are discussed below.
Payroll taxes have some attractive features for financing unemployment insurance. First, the payroll tax base corresponds well to the benefit principle of taxation, where those who benefit from a government service pay for the service. Second, permitting each state to set its own tax structure permits states to determine how generous their UI system should be while making states bear the consequences of the generosity of their UI benefits. Third, the procedure of relieving employers of 90 percent of the federal tax for conformity gives the federal government considerable leverage over the design of state programs-employers in states out of conformity would be subject to a payroll tax of 6.0 percent rather than 0.6 percent for the FUTA tax. The conformity requirement that states must use experience rating to set any employer's state UI tax rate below the FUTA level is an attractive financing feature, as it gives employers an incentive to make sure that claimants are in compliance with the separation requirements for UI eligibility. One essential principle is to balance benefits and financing. For example, if the maximum benefit amount is indexed to average earnings, then taxable wages should be indexed in a similar way to earnings. This principle of balancing system revenues and expenses should ensure fiscal integrity over business cycles.
There are, however, some financing features of the UI financing structure in the United
States that the EU may not find appealing. For example, the FUTA tax base is only $7,000, making the tax a regressive one and providing an incentive for employers to favor high-wage workers in hiring decisions; 35 the low tax base can be justified, at least in part, because UI benefits are not based on all earnings-a sizable proportion of workers earn more than the UI taxable wage maximum. Another unusual feature of the U.S. financing system is that the revenues are obtained through state taxes on employers, which then become part of the federal budget and are rebated to the states. This approach complicates the system and perhaps gives the false impression that the taxes raised by the states are federal in nature; an advantage of the current system is that it makes administration of the trust funds similar across states and facilitates the federal government's ability to make loans to states whose trust-fund balances are inadequate. A final feature of the U.S. financing system that the EU may find troubling is that state administrative costs are distributed to states based on historical cost experience; this approach creates a moral hazard whereby states can increase employee salaries and UI services without bearing the full cost.
Variations in State Provisions
The UI system in this country permits large variations in state provisions regarding features on the benefits side, such as monetary and nonmonetary eligibility, work test enforcement, benefit size, and benefit duration. The EU might wish to consider the advantages and disadvantages of permitting such large differences. On the tax side, there are variations in the tax base, experience rating, and wages subject to the state payroll tax. For example, the maximum number of weeks of coverage has traditionally been 26, but in 2016 a few states provide a maximum of 13 weeks (Missouri and North Carolina), and Massachusetts provides up to 30 weeks of benefits. 36 The maximum weekly benefit amount ranges from $240 in Arizona to $1,083 in Massachusetts. On the tax side, the payroll tax base is as low as $7,000 annually in three states (Arizona, California, and Florida) and as high as $44,000 in Washington State. State tax rates range from zero in many states up to 11.13 percent in Massachusetts.
Does it make sense to permit such large variation in taxes and benefits? The United
States historically has allowed states to vary the generosity of assistance programs; for example, in 2014, the range in state benefits for the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) welfare program for a family of three ranged from $170 per month in Mississippi to $923 in Alaska. 37 Large variations in assistance programs might encourage migration to high-payment states. The decision on whether to permit large variations in benefits depends on many factors, including sovereignty of the second-tier entities as well as the extent to which the program is centrally funded.
Redistribution Issues
Redistribution of funds raised can occur within states and across states in the U.S.
system. The UI system includes little redistribution across states, as funds raised for UI benefits all come from employers within the state. The exception is for state administrative expenses, where funds are distributed based on historical state experience in staffing and salaries. Within states, there is a greater possibility for redistribution among employers, depending on how well a state's experience rating system corresponds to an employer's experience in laying off workers.
The advantage of the U.S. approach is that each state decides how generous its benefits should be, but the state must be willing to raise enough funding to pay for the benefits. In contrast, the U.S. welfare system includes a substantial amount of redistribution, where wealthier states are required to pay a greater share of program costs than poorer states. 38 A system with substantial redistribution introduces the possibility of "institutional moral hazard," where the second-tier entities have an incentive to provide more benefits than they would be willing to pay for (Vandenbroucke et al. 2016) . The EU may wish to have some degree of redistribution-if not, the current system of independent national systems could be maintained.
Crisis Intervention
The United States has established two types of programs to deal with periods of very high unemployment. The extended benefit (EB) program has been in place since 1970; however, it has not been a functioning program in any significant way since 1980. It has been modified a number of times in terms of state and national triggers and benefit provisions, and it is a good program in principle. The idea behind the EB program is to have a permanent program in place that automatically goes into effect when there is unusually high unemployment. In practice, the EB program has proven to be politically unsustainable. It has been overwhelmed by a discretionary approach that is often used in times of generally high unemployment-i.e., enacting special legislation at the federal level to pay for longer-duration benefits. In the United
States, these programs have typically been financed entirely by the federal government, which possibly explains why states have set the parameters of their EB programs so that they are never triggered. Woodbury and Rubin (1997) 
